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The Need for Review: Allowing Defendants to 
Appeal the Factual Basis of a Conviction After 
Pleading Guilty 
Steven Schmidt∗ 
On September 4, 1991, the United States government 
charged Gary Johnson with conspiracy to possess with the in-
tent to distribute fifty grams or more of “crack” cocaine.1 Ac-
knowledging that he had participated in a drug deal, Mr. John-
son decided to plead guilty.2 At his plea hearing, however, Mr. 
Johnson denied that he conspired to sell over fifty grams of 
“crack” cocaine.3 Rather, he admitted to possessing and selling 
thirty-four grams and thereafter stated to the court that he had 
qualms with his plea agreement because “a man should be tried 
on what he sold.”4 The district court ignored this fact and sen-
tenced him to more than ten years in prison.5 In the face of this 
apparent injustice, Mr. Johnson appealed his conviction, claim-
ing that that there was no factual basis to support his guilty 
plea because he did not commit the acts charged in the indict-
ment.6 In twenty-six words, however, the Eleventh Circuit de-
nied Mr. Johnson the right to another opportunity to be heard: 
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University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to thank Professors Brad Clary 
and Stephen Cribari for their helpful insights and edits of this Note. I owe a 
great debt of gratitude as well to the wonderful editors and staff of the Minne-
sota Law Review, particularly Theresa Nagy and Joe Hansen. Finally, my sin-
cere appreciation to my parents, Laurie and Gary, my brother Brian, and the 
rest of my wonderful family and friends for supporting and encouraging me 
throughout law school. Copyright © 2010 by Steven Schmidt. 
 1. Initial Brief of Appellant at 7, United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778 
(11th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-2149), 1995 WL 17061772 at *7. Mr. Johnson was also 
charged with possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of “crack” 
cocaine. Id. 
 2. See id.  
 3. See id. at 9–12.  
 4. Id. at 9.  
 5. See Johnson, 89 F.3d at 779. 
 6. See id. at 784.  
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“Johnson’s contention [was] barred by his guilty plea. ‘A guilty 
plea, since it admits all the elements of a formal criminal 
charge, waives all nonjurisdictional defects.’”7 As a result, the 
court upheld Mr. Johnson’s convictions and forced him to serve 
the remainder of his sentence.8 
Although over fourteen years old, the reasoning the Elev-
enth Circuit stressed continues to underline one argument in a 
split among the federal courts regarding the right of a criminal 
defendant to challenge, on direct appeal, the adequacy of the 
factual basis that supports his guilty plea. The Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure state that “[b]efore entering judgment on a 
guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual ba-
sis for the plea.”9 The existence of this factual basis require-
ment protects the rights of criminal defendants and helps to 
prevent the punishment of innocent individuals.10 Given the 
importance of this right, courts of appeals from multiple cir-
cuits have held that a defendant does not sacrifice his right to 
appeal the adequacy of the factual basis of his conviction de-
spite having entered a guilty plea.11 These courts reason that a 
lack of an adequate factual basis is a substantial defect which 
is “‘so fundamental as to cast serious doubt on the voluntari-
ness of the plea.’”12 These decisions, however, conflict with oth-
er opinions which provide that a defendant waives his right to 
appeal any nonjurisdictional defects after entering a guilty plea 
at the district court level.13 These courts have held that the 
adequacy of the factual basis that supports a guilty plea is a 
nonjurisdictional defect that is logically consistent “with the is-
 
 7. Id. (quoting United States v. Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 
1986)).  
 8. Id. at 785.  
 9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).  
 10. See John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and Misdemea-
nor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas but Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88, 95 
(1977) (explaining that the factual basis requirement serves to protect the 
rights of criminal defendants).  
 11. See United States v. Lacey, 569 F.3d 319, 323–24 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 431 (2009); United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 497 (2d 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002); United 
States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2000).  
 12. Adams, 448 F.3d at 502 (quoting Godwin v. United States, 687 F.2d 
585, 591 (2d Cir. 1982)).  
 13. See United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778, 784 (11th Cir. 1996); Unit-
ed States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Freed, 
688 F.2d 24, 25–26 (6th Cir. 1982).  
  
286 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:284 
 
sue of factual guilt,”14 and therefore cannot be reviewed on ap-
peal.  
This Note explores whether federal criminal defendants 
preserve the right to challenge the adequacy of the factual ba-
sis of their convictions on appeal after entering an uncondition-
al guilty plea at the district court level. Part I examines the 
background principles of the factual basis requirement and the 
rationale behind decisions that both allow and deny appellate 
review of claims alleging an inadequate factual basis. Part II 
articulates important legal and policy arguments that demon-
strate why appellate courts must review a defendant’s chal-
lenge to the adequacy of the factual basis of his guilty plea. 
Part III explores possible resolutions to this complex circuit 
split and suggests that the Supreme Court propose an amend-
ment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to preserve 
the right of federal defendants to appeal the adequacy of the 
factual basis of an unconditional guilty plea. Moreover, the 
proposed amendment should mandate that courts of appeals 
adopt a “plain error” standard when analyzing inadequate fac-
tual basis appeals to eliminate the current inconsistencies that 
exist with the standard of review for these important claims. 
This Note concludes that such action is urgently needed to re-
solve the confusion and ambiguity that exist in the federal 
criminal justice system concerning this vital protection of the 
rights of criminal defendants.  
I.  BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF THE FACTUAL BASIS 
REQUIREMENT   
The factual basis requirement has evolved into an impor-
tant protection for criminal defendants. The Supreme Court 
has addressed the concept on numerous occasions, but has put 
forth varied signals regarding the essential nature of the re-
quirement. As a result, the courts of appeals have applied di-
vergent legal reasoning and a wide variety of standards of re-
view when examining a defendant’s claim that an inadequate 
factual basis supports her guilty plea. The result is an amal-
gam of case law that places the defendant’s right to put forth 
an inadequate factual basis appeal in doubt.  
 
 14. Freed, 688 F.2d at 25; see also Willis, 992 F.2d at 490 (“[A] guilty plea 
constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects including ‘the right to contest 
the factual merits of the charges.’” (internal citations and quotation omitted)).  
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A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FACTUAL BASIS 
REQUIREMENT 
For the majority of its history, the American criminal jus-
tice system has not required courts to assure that a sufficient 
set of facts supported a plea of guilty.15 Prior to 1966, the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure contained no such require-
ment,16 and some courts specifically noted that they were not 
required to conduct a factual basis inquiry.17 Moreover, most 
appellate courts refused to review the facts underlying a guilty 
plea because the “plea itself [was] considered decisive on the is-
sue.”18 As a result, the process for pleading guilty “often ig-
nore[d] the issue of guilt or innocence,”19 and did not require 
the courts to look at the facts or circumstances underlying the 
defendant’s plea.20  
The factual basis requirement arose as an element of the 
Supreme Court’s efforts to increase the rights of criminal de-
fendants under Chief Justice Earl Warren.21 As part of this 
push, in 1966 the Court amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure to include the requirement that a factual 
basis supports a defendant’s plea of guilty.22 The new rule 
stated that “[t]he court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea 
of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for 
the plea.”23 The Advisory Committee’s note to the amendment 
explained that the requirement that a factual basis supports a 
guilty plea would “protect a defendant who is in the position of 
 
 15. See Note, The Trial Judge’s Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of 
Guilty Pleas, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 306, 307–08 (“[T]he courts have held that 
Rule 11 does not require an inquiry into the factual basis of a guilty plea.”).  
 16. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1944).  
 17. See, e.g., Adkins v. United States, 298 F.2d 842, 844 (8th Cir. 1962) 
(per curiam) (explaining that there is “no requirement that the court must en-
ter a formal finding” of a factual basis to support a guilty plea).  
 18. Note, supra note 15, at 309 (citing Adam v. United States, 274 F.2d 
880 (10th Cir. 1960); Bloombaum v. United States, 211 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 
1954); Richardson v. United States, 217 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1954); Friedman v. 
United States, 200 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1952)).  
 19. Id. at 306. 
 20. Id. at 307–08.  
 21. See Terry L. Elling, Guilty Plea Inquiries: Do We Care Too Much?, 134 
MIL. L. REV. 195, 211 (1991) (“Consistent with its well-known concern for an 
extension of individual rights, the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, subjected guilty pleas to considerable scrutiny.”).  
 22. Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the U.S. District 
Courts, 383 U.S. 1095, 1097 (1966).  
 23. Id.  
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pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the 
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually 
fall within the charge.”24 The Advisory Committee further 
stated that a court should set aside a guilty plea if it is not 
supported by a sufficient factual basis.25  
Shortly after the 1966 amendments, the Supreme Court so-
lidified the importance of the factual basis requirement in 
McCarthy v. United States.26 In that case, the petitioner chal-
lenged the validity of his guilty plea on a charge of federal tax 
evasion, arguing that the trial “court had entered judgment 
without determining ‘that there [was] . . . a factual basis for the 
plea.’”27 In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that a criminal 
defendant may “plead anew” if the district court accepts a 
guilty plea without “fully adhering to the procedure[s]” of Rule 
11.28 The Court explained that to comply with Rule 11, the 
judge must “personally inquire” into whether the defendant 
understands the charges, and must “satisfy himself that there 
is a factual basis for the plea.”29 The Court made it explicitly 
clear that it based its decision solely on its “supervisory power 
over the lower federal courts” and did not address any constitu-
tional arguments raised by the petitioner.30 
B. MIXED SIGNALS: SUPREME COURT RULE 11 JURISPRUDENCE 
AFTER MCCARTHY 
In subsequent decisions following McCarthy, the Warren 
Court continued to state the importance of strict adherence to 
the requirements of Rule 11.31 Under Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, however, the Court retreated somewhat from these 
stringent Rule 11 requisites with a series of cases known as the 
 
 24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1966).  
 25. Id. The Advisory Committee also explained that the factual basis re-
quirement did not apply to nolo contendre pleas, stating that “it is desirable in 
some cases” to allow for a nolo contendere plea without a factual basis in-
quiry. Id.  
 26. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).  
 27. Id. at 462 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3)). McCarthy also argued 
that the district court failed to determine that the guilty plea was made “vol-
untarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.” Id.  
 28. Id. at 463–64.  
 29. Id. at 467.  
 30. Id. at 464.  
 31. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (holding that 
the trial court must make an “affirmative showing” that a guilty plea is “intel-
ligent and voluntary”).  
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Brady Trilogy.32 Although none of these three cases directly 
addressed issues involving the factual basis requirement, they 
demonstrated the Court’s view that “adequate representation 
will cure a number of ills if a defendant’s guilty plea is other-
wise accurate and voluntary.”33 Moreover, in North Carolina 
v. Alford,34 the Burger Court arguably diluted the importance 
of the factual basis requirement35 when it held that a defendant 
could refuse to admit to the facts of a crime and still plead 
guilty for the sole purpose of avoiding a harsher punishment.36 
In its more recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
sent mixed signals regarding the importance of the factual ba-
sis requirement. On the one hand, the Court has permitted de-
fendants to challenge the factual basis of their pleas via collat-
eral attack. In Bousley v. United States,37 the Court held that 
the defendant could challenge the validity of his guilty plea be-
cause of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a federal gun 
statute that followed his conviction.38 The Court explained that 
if the petitioner could prove that the district court had “misin-
formed him as to the elements” of the offense charged, his plea 
would be “constitutionally invalid.”39 The Court, however, 
based its reasoning on the constitutional principles set forth in 
Brady v. United States that a guilty plea must be “voluntary” 
and “intelligent,”40 and not on the Rule 11 factual basis re-
quirement.  
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has stressed the 
importance of the finality of plea agreements, and has limited 
the factual basis requirement in some circumstances.41 For ex-
 
 32. See Elling, supra note 21, at 215 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North 
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970)).  
 33. Id. at 216 (citing McMann, 397 U.S. at 766–68).  
 34. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  
 35. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargain-
ing, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1293 (1975) (arguing that the Alford pleas have made 
the factual basis requirement “relatively unimportant”). 
 36. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37–38. 
 37. 523 U.S. 614 (1998). 
 38. See id. at 618–19.  
 39. Id. (quoting United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
 40. Id. at 618 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 748).  
 41. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitu-
tional Rights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 
1265 (1978) (“The Court has expressly recognized that federal courts and 
many state courts want a defendant’s guilty plea to be a final, binding adjudi-
cation . . . .”). 
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ample, in United States v. Broce,42 the Court held that a guilty 
plea “comprehend[s] all of the factual and legal elements neces-
sary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt,”43 and it 
therefore prohibits a defendant from challenging his conviction 
on the grounds of double jeopardy.44 In issuing its holding, the 
Court distinguished Broce’s claim from that of the petitioners 
in Blackledge v. Perry45 and Menna v. New York,46 two cases 
where the Court permitted review of the defendant’s claim. The 
Court explained that the Blackledge and Menna decisions were 
“exceptions where on the face of the record the court had no 
power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence,”47 and 
Broce’s claim, which sought to introduce new evidence, did not 
fit into this category.48 The reasoning presented in Broce 
represents the Court’s beliefs that a guilty plea symbolizes the 
final adjudication of a case and that the factual basis require-
ment should not extend beyond the scope of Rule 11.49  
This divergence of precedents from the Supreme Court re-
garding the importance of the factual basis requirement has 
left lower courts with a lack of clear guidance for deciding 
whether a defendant has the ability to challenge the factual ba-
sis underlying her guilty plea. As the discussion in the next 
section demonstrates, the various courts of appeals have taken 
great liberty in interpreting Supreme Court decisions to fit 
their desired outcomes.  
C. NAVIGATING A LABYRINTH: THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The question of whether a defendant may appeal his con-
viction after entering an unconditional guilty plea has produced 
a wide array of opinions from the federal appellate courts. The 
case law has developed in such a manner that conflicting au-
 
 42. 488 U.S. 563 (1989). 
 43. Id. at 569. 
 44. Id. at 565. 
 45. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
 46. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam). 
 47. Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 574. 
 48. Id. at 576.  
 49. Id. at 570, 574. The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of the 
finality of guilty pleas in other contexts, as well. See Jenny Roberts, The Myth-
ical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convic-
tions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 670, 736 (2008) (noting the importance the Court has placed on the final-
ity of guilty pleas with regard to whether judges must inform defendants of 
the collateral consequences of plea agreements). 
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thority exists even within circuits. Moreover, circuit courts 
have applied various standards of review to inadequate factual 
basis claims. Nevertheless, two discrete legal arguments have 
emerged that alternatively support and oppose a defendant’s 
right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis of his guilty 
plea.  
1. Perplexing Intra-Circuit Splits 
A recent decision from the Eighth Circuit provides an apt 
example of the muddled case law that has materialized within 
the federal appellate courts. In United States v. Cheney,50 the 
Eighth Circuit recognized that in a 1994 case it had “reviewed 
the adequacy of a factual basis under Rule 11 despite an un-
conditional guilty plea.”51 Conversely, the appellate court noted 
that, in a 2001 decision, it held that “a defendant, by entering a 
guilty plea that was not conditional, [had] waived his right to 
appeal the sufficiency of the factual basis for one element of the 
offense of conviction.”52 After identifying this conflict, the court 
of appeals in Cheney chose not to resolve the dispute and 
elected to review the adequacy of the factual basis of the defen-
dant’s plea because the government failed to argue that the de-
fendant had waived his right to an appeal.53 
Similar jurisprudence from the Fourth Circuit presents 
another example of a puzzling intra-circuit split. In United 
States v. Willis,54 the court of appeals announced, with the pur-
pose of “eras[ing] any ambiguity that may have existed,” that a 
guilty plea “establishes the elements of the offense and the ma-
terial facts necessary to support the conviction.”55 The court, 
therefore, concluded that the defendant waived any right to ap-
peal the adequacy of the factual basis of his plea.56 However, 
less than four years later in United States v. Mitchell,57 the 
Fourth Circuit declined to follow its own unambiguous rule, 
stating that “it is well settled that a defendant may raise on di-
rect appeal the failure of a district court to develop on the 
 
 50. 571 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 51. Id. at 768 (citing United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1012–13 (8th 
Cir. 1994)).  
 52. Id. (citing United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1165 (8th Cir. 2001)).  
 53. Id. at 769.  
 54. 992 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1993).  
 55. Id. at 490.  
 56. Id. at 491. 
 57. 104 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 1997).  
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record a factual basis for a plea.”58 The court noted the Willis 
decision, but decided that it did not control because, unlike the 
defendant in Willis, the defendant in Mitchell specifically chal-
lenged the factual basis of his plea under Rule 11.59 Subsequent 
decisions from the Fourth Circuit have vacillated, with some 
judges following the precedent set in Mitchell and reviewing a 
factual basis appeal,60 and others following Willis by concluding 
that a defendant’s guilty plea waives his right to challenge the 
facts that support his conviction.61 
2. Reasoning of the Courts of Appeals 
The examples from the Eighth and Fourth Circuits demon-
strate the confusion and inconsistencies that exist among the 
courts of appeals. Indeed, similar intra-circuit splits exist in the 
Sixth62 and Eleventh63 Circuits. Despite this confusion, the 
abundance of available case law has produced two distinct ar-
guments governing whether defendants can appeal the factual 
basis of their convictions after entering an unconditional guilty 
plea.  
Courts holding that a defendant waives his right to appeal 
base their decisions principally on the idea that a guilty plea 
forgoes a challenge to all nonjurisdictional defects.64 Tradition-
ally, a jurisdictional defect is a defect that “goes to the power of 
a federal court to try a defendant.”65 These defects include chal-
lenges to subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and 
 
 58. Id. at 652 n.2. 
 59. Id.  
 60. See, e.g., United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Molina, 286 F. App’x 94, 96 (4th Cir. 2008).  
 62. Compare United States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 25–26 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(appeal waived), with United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 
1995) (appeal reviewed). Though Freed involved an appeal of the adequacy of 
the factual basis after the entrance of a plea of nolo contendere, the court 
treated it as a guilty plea for the purposes of its analysis. Freed, 688 F.2d at 
25–26. Subsequent cases from the Sixth Circuit have cited Freed for the prop-
osition that entrance of an unconditional guilty plea waives the possibility of 
appeal based on an inadequate factual basis. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 
No. 97-3628, 1998 WL 708746, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 1998) (holding that the 
defendant’s guilty plea precluded him from challenging the factual basis of his 
conviction for illegal possession of a firearm). 
 63. Compare United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778, 784 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(appeal waived), with United States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (appeal reviewed).  
 64. See Johnson, 89 F.3d at 784; United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 
(4th Cir. 1993). 
 65. United States v. Moloney, 287 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2006).  
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adequate notice.66 In determining that the factual basis re-
quirement does not fall into this category, courts have con-
cluded that any claim “not logically inconsistent with the issue 
of factual guilt,” including “the right to contest the charges,” is 
nonjurisdictional.67 By determining that an appeal based on the 
factual basis requirement is nonjurisdictional, courts avoid 
evaluating the factual discrepancies raised by the defendant. 
In addition, in holding that a defendant has waived his 
right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis of his guilty 
plea, courts of appeals have emphasized the importance that 
the Supreme Court has placed on the finality of guilty pleas.68 
Moreover, those arguing that a defendant has no right to such 
an appeal often cite tactical decisions the defendant has made 
to support their argument. For example, courts have held that 
a defendant forgoes any challenge to the adequacy of the fac-
tual basis of his conviction when he signs a waiver that ex-
pressly states that he will not appeal.69 If the express waiver is 
“entered into knowingly and voluntarily” by the defendant, the 
plea is “valid.”70 In addition, courts have noted that defendants 
may enter conditional pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(b)(2).71 A conditional plea allows a defendant, 
with “the consent of the court and the government,” to reserve 
“the right to have an appellate court review an adverse deter-
mination of a specified pretrial motion.”72 The defendant may 
 
 66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 65 cmt. d (1982) (noting 
that issues of adequate notice, territorial jurisdiction, and subject-matter ju-
risdiction are “jurisdictional” when a consideration in default judgments).  
 67. Freed, 688 F.2d at 25; see also United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 
1166 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[A] valid guilty plea forecloses an attack on a conviction 
unless ‘on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction 
or impose the sentence.’” (quoting Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 604 
(8th Cir. 1997))).  
 68. See, e.g., Beck, 250 F.3d at 1166 (8th Cir. 2001) (“‘[A guilty plea] does 
not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea 
rested on a faulty premise.’” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
757 (1970))); Willis, 992 F.2d at 490 (noting that after a defendant enters a 
guilty plea, the “‘inquiry is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea 
was both counseled and voluntary.’” (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 
563, 569 (1989))). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001).  
 70. United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001); cf. David 
E. Carney, Waiver of the Right to Appeal Sentencing in Plea Agreements with 
the Federal Government, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1019, 1036–38 (1999) (dis-
cussing policy reasons that support enforcing waivers in plea agreements).  
 71. See Beck, 250 F.3d at 1165. 
 72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).  
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then withdraw the plea if she prevails on appeal.73 Courts have 
explained that under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
the defendant has an “affirmative duty” to preserve challenges 
for appeal.74 Courts have therefore concluded that defendants 
who agree to waive or fail to preserve their right to an appeal 
cannot argue at the appellate court level that they are entitled 
to review.75 
Decisions permitting appellate review of factual basis 
claims stress the importance of factual accuracy and the prin-
ciple that the underlying facts must constitute a crime.76 Many 
of these decisions rely on the primary purpose of the factual ba-
sis requirement, which is to protect the rights of a defendant 
who does not realize that “‘his conduct does not actually fall 
within the definition of the crime charged.’”77 One court allow-
ing review explained that the factual basis requirement “‘en-
sures that the court make clear exactly what a defendant ad-
mits to, and whether those admissions are factually sufficient 
to constitute the alleged crime.’”78 Another decision permitting 
review identified “the core objectives of Rule 11,” which include 
ensuring that the plea is “free from coercion” and that the de-
fendant understands the “nature of the charges against her” 
and the “direct consequences of the guilty plea.”79  
Similarly, other courts have noted that a plea of guilty is a 
“grave and solemn act” because it waives important rights, and 
therefore it is crucial that judges “follow the detailed proce-
dures set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b),” including the factual 
basis requirement.80 One court stressed the importance of the 
factual basis requirement by stating that a defendant pleading 
guilty “to actions that do not constitute a crime” results in “‘a 
complete miscarriage of justice.’”81  
 
 73. Id.  
 74. See United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 416 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 75. See Beck, 250 F.3d at 1165. 
 76. See United States v. Smith, 160 F.3d 117, 121–22 (2d Cir. 1998) (dis-
cussing the rationale underlying the factual basis requirement). 
 77. See United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002) (quot-
ing United States v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 78. United States v. Thomas, 367 F.3d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991)).  
 79. United States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 80. United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 497–98 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 182–83 (2005)).  
 81. United States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). 
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Many decisions evaluating the adequacy of the factual ba-
sis of a guilty plea do so without even questioning whether the 
defendant’s plea waived his right to an appeal, and simply take 
it as a given that the appellate court may review the claim.82 
However, decisions that do consider whether a defendant has 
waived his right to an appeal and ultimately permit review 
have stressed the important goal of the criminal justice system 
to protect a defendant’s rights and to ensure that he is not con-
victed for acts that do not constitute a crime.83 Although many 
of these courts ultimately find that an adequate factual basis 
did exist and affirm the defendant’s conviction,84 their willing-
ness to review a defendant’s claim emphasizes the importance 
of the factual basis requirement to the fair administration of 
justice.  
3. Differing Standards of Review 
In addition to the confusion regarding whether to permit 
review, appellate courts have applied many different standards 
of review when evaluating defendants’ claims of an inadequate 
factual basis. Some courts have used a “de novo” standard for 
the factual basis requirement,85 which evaluates the legal rea-
soning anew and does not defer to the trial courts holdings.86 
Other courts have applied an “abuse of discretion” standard.87 
Under this standard, a court will not overturn a finding that a 
 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Lacey, 569 F.3d 319, 323–24 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(reviewing the factual basis of the defendant’s conviction for possessing child 
pornography without determining whether the defendant had waived his right 
to appeal by entering a guilty plea). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d 466, 474 (5th Cir. 
2008) (“The purpose of the rule is to protect a defendant who may plead guilty 
. . . without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the defini-
tion of the charged crime.”); United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1524 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (“Rule 11[(b)(3)] requires the court to assure itself simply that the 
conduct to which the defendant admits is in fact an offense under the statuto-
ry provision under which he is pleading guilty.”).  
 84. See, e.g., Lacey, 569 F.3d at 323–24 (determining that a sufficient fac-
tual basis existed to support the defendant’s plea of guilty for possessing child 
pornography); United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 730 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(finding a sufficient factual basis to support the defendant’s guilty plea for ac-
cepting a bribe). 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Gaither, 245 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 86. See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards 
of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 246 (2009) (“Courts using de novo 
review examine the trial court’s application of the law without affording the 
lower court discretion.”).  
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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sufficient factual basis existed unless the determination “‘can-
not be located within the range of permissible decisions.’”88 
Other courts have applied a “clearly erroneous” review stand-
ard, under which the appellate court may not overturn the trial 
court unless it believes that the error is clear.89 Although not as 
deferential as an abuse of discretion standard, the clear error 
standard still affords the trial court great latitude, and an ap-
pellate court may not overturn a decision because it disagrees 
with the trial courts’ findings.90 Still other courts have applied 
a “plain error” standard of review,91 which applies when a de-
fendant fails to raise a claim at the district court level.92 Under 
the plain error standard, the defendant must demonstrate that 
there is “‘(1) an error; (2) that is clear or plain; (3) that affects 
[his] substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fair-
ness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”93 
In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that in order to sa-
tisfy the plain error standard after entering a guilty plea, the 
defendant “must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
error, he would not have entered the plea.”94  
This mix of case law has produced an ambiguous standard, 
which allows individual judges almost unfettered discretion in 
deciding whether and how to consider a defendant’s claim that 
an inadequate factual basis supports his guilty plea. Moreover, 
mixed messages from the Supreme Court have placed the de-
fendant’s right to challenge the adequacy of the factual basis of 
his conviction in doubt. As the next Part demonstrates, it is 
crucial that the criminal justice system preserve a defendant’s 
right to appeal and grants her the opportunity to challenge the 
facts that support her plea.  
 
 88. United States v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003)).  
 89. See United States v. Rivas, 85 F.3d 193, 194 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 90. Peters, supra note 86, at 245 (“[A] reviewing court must not reverse 
the trial court under this standard of review merely because it disagrees with 
it or because it would have interpreted the facts differently.” (citing Ander-
son v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–75 (1985))).  
 91. See United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 92. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
 93. Baymon, 312 F.3d at 728 (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Vasquez, 216 F.3d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993) (explaining the standard for “plain error” 
review under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 52(b)). 
 94. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004).  
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II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF FACTUAL BASIS REVIEW   
There are a variety of reasons why the criminal justice sys-
tem should afford defendants the right to appeal the adequacy 
of the factual basis of their convictions after entering an un-
conditional guilty plea. First, the case law that defines a factual 
basis defect as nonjurisdictional oversimplifies the concept of a 
jurisdictional defect. Second, even if a factual basis defect is 
considered nonjurisdictional, Supreme Court precedent dictates 
that appellate review may still occur. Third, the concept of 
“plain error” review embedded in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure dictates review of an inadequate factual basis claim. 
Fourth, important public policy concerns mandate that a de-
fendant maintain his right to appeal if he alleges that an in-
adequate factual basis supports his plea. These reasons reveal 
the important need for the criminal justice system to act ur-
gently to resolve this confusing circuit split.  
A. AN INADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS MAY REPRESENT A 
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT 
Decisions that deny review rest primarily on the idea that 
an inadequate factual basis falls under the category of a nonju-
risdictional defect that a defendant may not contest after he en-
ters a guilty plea.95 However, this argument erroneously limits 
the definition of a “jurisdictional defect,” and fails to capture 
the importance of the factual basis requirement to an effective 
and just guilty plea.  
As traditionally understood, a jurisdictional defect is a de-
fect that “goes to the power of a federal court to try a defen-
dant.”96 Some courts have differentiated between jurisdictional 
defects and offense elements that go “‘to the merits of the 
case.’”97 In so doing, these courts have concluded that factual 
basis errors fall into the latter category.98 However, certain fac-
tual basis errors are jurisdictional defects. For example, in or-
der to secure a conviction of a noncitizen or resident alien un-
der the Federal Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 
(MDLEA), the government must demonstrate that the defen-
dant manufactured, distributed, or possessed with the intent to 
distribute “a controlled substance on board a vessel of the Unit-
 
 95. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778, 784 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 96. United States v. Moloney, 287 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2002).  
 97. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (quoting La-
mar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916)). 
 98. See United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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ed States or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”99 Congress has specifically stated that the fact of 
whether the ship is a vessel of the United States or under its 
jurisdiction is “not an element of an offense.”100 Therefore, if in 
determining the factual basis for a defendant’s guilty plea the 
court fails to establish the fact that the defendant was “on 
board a vessel of the United States or a vessel subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States,”101 then there is not only a fac-
tual basis error, but also a defect in the court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the defendant.102  
This example demonstrates how an error in the factual ba-
sis supporting a guilty plea agreement can strike at subject-
matter jurisdiction and “‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional 
power to adjudicate the case.’”103 The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that this issue “can never be forfeited or waived,”104 
and Congress has provided through the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure that a court may hear a claim of a defect in sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction “at any time while the case is pend-
ing.”105 As a result, the argument that a defendant waives a 
claim of an inadequate factual basis fails when a factual basis 
error also affects the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.  
B. REVIEW OF A FACTUAL BASIS ERROR IS APPROPRIATE EVEN 
IF IT IS CONSIDERED A NONJURISDICTIONAL DEFECT 
Those who contend that a guilty plea waives a defendant’s 
right to challenge the factual basis that supports his plea will 
state that absent an express statute from Congress, as is the 
case with the MDLEA, the factual basis underlying a conviction 
is a nonjurisdictional defect because it involves offense ele-
ments that are “not logically inconsistent with the issue of fac-
tual guilt.”106 Even if one accepts this reasoning, the impor-
 
 99. 46 U.S.C. § 70503 (2006).  
 100. Id. § 70504.  
 101. Id. § 70503(a).  
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1105 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the jurisdictional element of the MDLEA should be treated as an 
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction).  
 103. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (quoting Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). 
 104. Id.  
 105. See FED R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B). 
 106. See United States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 25 (6th Cir. 1982); cf. Augus-
tine V. Cheng, Appellate Review of Double Jeopardy Claims in the Guilty Plea 
Context, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 989 (1988) (“[A] voluntary and intelligent 
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tance of the factual basis requirement mandates appellate re-
view regardless of whether a court considers the claim nonju-
risdictional. On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has 
permitted appellate review of nonjurisdictional defects. For ex-
ample, in Blackledge,107 the Court held that the defendant’s 
guilty plea did not waive a due process challenge of prosecu-
torial vindictiveness.108 In holding that the defendant did not 
waive his right to appeal, the Court differentiated between the 
defendant’s claim and “independent claims relating to the de-
privation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the en-
try of the guilty plea,” which the Court had previously held 
were waived by such a plea.109 The Court explained that unlike 
these “independent claims,” Perry’s claim directly addressed 
“the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony 
charge.”110 The Court emphasized the importance of this right 
and concluded that the defendant’s guilty plea did not bar a 
challenge to his conviction.111 
Moreover, in Menna,112 the Supreme Court allowed the de-
fendant to challenge his guilty plea on Fifth Amendment 
grounds of double jeopardy.113 The Court expressly stated that 
its earlier decisions did not stand for the proposition that 
“guilty pleas inevitably ‘waive’ all antecedent constitutional vi-
olations.”114 On the contrary, the Court described the effect of a 
guilty plea as rendering “irrelevant those constitutional viola-
tions not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of 
factual guilt.”115 
The language used in Blackledge and Menna creates confu-
sion in that it appears to distinguish between jurisdictional de-
fects that can be reviewed and nonjurisdictional claims that are 
waived,116 yet permits review of certain nonjurisdictional de-
 
plea of guilty is a conclusive admission of factual guilt that renders ‘irrelevant’ 
those constitutional violations that relate to the establishment of factual guilt.”).  
 107. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
 108. Id. at 28–29.  
 109. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973).  
 110. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30.  
 111. Id. at 31.  
 112. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam). 
 113. Id. at 62. 
 114. Id. at 63 n.2. 
 115. Id.  
 116. See id. (“A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those con-
stitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of 
factual guilt . . . .”). This language is practically identical to the definitions 
used by courts of appeals to distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjuris-
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fects. Indeed, scholars have criticized the Court’s holdings, ar-
guing that the Court “has not found a meaningful device for 
separating claims that should survive a guilty plea from claims 
that should not.”117 Regardless of the confusion the cases 
create, the holdings of Blackledge and Menna demonstrate that 
the determination of whether a guilty plea waives a particular 
claim does not rest solely on the classification of the claim as a 
“jurisdictional defect.”118 On the contrary, the Court has shown 
that it will examine the nature of the argument and conclude, 
in certain circumstances, that the defendant’s claim must be 
heard on appeal. 
A relatively recent Supreme Court case provides further 
support for the idea that whether a claim is “jurisdictional” 
does not decide the question of appellate review. In United 
States v. Cotton,119 the Court expressly found that a defect in 
the indictment did not represent a jurisdictional defect because 
“defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to 
adjudicate a case,”120 but rather go “only to the merits of the 
case.”121 After it put forward this holding, however, the Court 
did not rule that the defendant waived his right to appeal.122 
On the contrary, the Court described the defendant’s claim as 
“forfeited” and engaged in plain error review.123 The unanimous 
Court’s analysis further demonstrates that an appellate court 
may review the merits of a defendant’s appeal regardless of 
whether a jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional defect is at issue.  
Despite this recent reaffirmation from the Court that a de-
termination of whether a claim is jurisdictional does not control 
whether it is waived, proponents of the idea that a defendant’s 
guilty plea waives a challenge to the adequacy of the factual 
basis of his conviction may contend that the holdings and ra-
 
dictional defects. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 25 (6th Cir. 
1982) (“Like a plea of guilty, a plea of nolo contendere constitutes a waiver of 
all so-called ‘non-jurisdictional defects’ or, more accurately, any claims not log-
ically inconsistent with the issue of factual guilt . . . .”).  
 117. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the 
Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 19 (1975).  
 118. See Guilty Pleas, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 403, 431 (2009) 
(noting that a guilty plea “does not waive every nonjurisdictional error”). 
 119. 535 U.S. 625 (2002). 
 120. Id. at 630. 
 121. Id. at 631 (quoting Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916)). In 
issuing its ruling, the Court expressly overruled its prior precedent set in Ex 
Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887).  
 122. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. 
 123. Id.  
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tionales of Blackledge and Menna do not apply because an error 
in the factual basis does not represent a constitutional viola-
tion.124 Moreover, these proponents may cite the Court’s expla-
nation in Menna and argue that a factual basis defect is one 
that is “not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment 
of factual guilt.”125 Even if one agrees with this reasoning, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the concept of plain 
error review dictate that a defendant may challenge the ade-
quacy of the factual basis that supports his guilty plea. 
C. PLAIN ERROR REVIEW ENSURES THAT A DEFENDANT DOES 
NOT WAIVE A CLAIM OF AN INADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS 
By its nature, a defendant will not raise a factual basis er-
ror at the trial court level; if a defendant objects to the factual 
basis underlying his plea, a judge simply cannot and will not 
accept the plea agreement.126 As a result, some courts have 
concluded that a defendant who fails to raise an inadequate 
factual basis claim at the trial court level has waived his right 
to appeal.127 However, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
allow for review of claims not raised at the trial court level 
when “plain error” has occurred.128 As discussed above, the Su-
preme Court has established a four-part test for determining 
whether a claim may be reviewed for plain error.129  
Supreme Court precedent dictates that the plain error 
standard should apply to factual basis errors. In United States 
v. Vonn,130 the Court explicitly held that the plain error stand-
ard applied to violations of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.131 The Court concluded that the defendant 
carries the burden to demonstrate that the trial court judge vi-
olated the Federal Rules by failing to adequately advise him of 
 
 124. See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Bra-
dy and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 474 (2001) (“The Court has never 
imposed a constitutional duty upon courts to find a factual basis in support of 
a guilty plea.”). 
 125. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975); see also United 
States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 25 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 126. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).  
 127. See United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001).  
 128. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights 
may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”).  
 129. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–35 (1993). The Supreme 
Court has recently reaffirmed this test for plain error review. See United 
States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010). 
 130. 535 U.S. 55 (2002). 
 131. Id. at 59.  
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his right to counsel.132 Although the Court imposed this de-
manding standard on the defendant, it specifically did not hold 
that he had waived his right to appeal. On the contrary, the 
Court expressly evaluated the defendant’s claim as “forfeited” 
rather than “waived.”133 The Court noted that the government 
had argued earlier that the defendant had waived his claim, 
but that the court of appeals had rejected this argument.134 In 
its holding, the Supreme Court elected not to disturb this as-
pect of the court of appeals’s analysis.135  
The Court’s holding in Vonn dictates that appellate courts 
should analyze Rule 11 errors, including inadequate factual ba-
sis claims under Rule 11(b)(3), as forfeited claims under the 
plain error standard. In United States v. Olano,136 the Supreme 
Court explained the crucial difference between a “forfeiture” 
and a “waiver.”137 The Court stated that “forfeiture is the fail-
ure to make the timely assertion of a right,” whereas “waiver is 
the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.’”138 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated in various 
contexts that a waiver must be “knowing,” “intelligent,” and 
“voluntary.”139 Therefore, a waiver must involve a conscious ac-
tion by the defendant to abandon his rights.140  
Given these definitions, it is difficult to contend that a de-
fendant makes an “intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment” of the right to challenge the adequacy of the factual basis 
of his conviction when he pleads guilty. If the defendant knew 
that the facts underlying his plea were inadequate, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that he would have entered a guilty plea. 
When a defendant enters a plea of guilty but fails to recognize 
that an inadequate set of facts supports his plea, he forfeits the 
claim at the trial court level by “failing to make a timely asser-
tion” of his right under Rule 11(b)(3).141  
 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 59 n.1.  
 134. Id. at 61 n.3.  
 135. Id.  
 136. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).  
 137. Id. at 733.  
 138. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 139. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that a 
waiver of the Miranda warnings must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary). 
 140. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“A waiver is ordinari-
ly an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege.”).  
 141. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). 
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Therefore, the correct standard of review for factual basis 
claims is the plain error standard. A step-by-step analysis of 
the four-pronged plain error test as it applies to inadequate fac-
tual basis claims demonstrates that, in many circumstances, 
these claims warrant reversal. First, the Court has explained 
that an “error” is a “deviation from a legal rule.”142 In this in-
stance, an inadequate factual basis deviates from Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3). Second, the Court has stated 
that when deciding whether an error is “plain,” appellate courts 
must ask whether the error is “clear” or “obvious.”143 An error 
in which the underlying facts do not constitute a crime would 
assuredly meet this standard.  
Third, in defining whether an error “‘affects a substantial 
right,’”144 the Court has explained that “the error must have 
been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the dis-
trict court proceedings.”145 A lack of sufficient facts supporting 
a guilty plea affects the outcome of the district court proceed-
ings and must be considered “prejudicial.” The Court has ex-
pounded that the “court of appeals should no doubt correct a 
plain forfeited error that causes the conviction or sentencing of 
an actually innocent defendant.”146 A factual basis error that 
leads to a conviction in a case where the defendant did not ac-
tually commit a crime falls under this standard. Fourth, a fac-
tual basis error must “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”147 A court convict-
ing an innocent defendant destroys the public’s faith in the 
judicial system.148 Finally, the Court has explained that for 
plain error review under Rule 11, the defendant “must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not 
have entered the plea.”149 If a defendant realized that the fac-
tual basis supporting his plea did not constitute a crime, it is 
extremely unlikely that he would choose to plead guilty. 
 
 142. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1993).  
 143. Id. at 734.  
 144. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b)). 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 736.  
 147. Id. (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1938)). 
 148. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values 
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1386–88 (2003) (discussing how convicting innocent 
defendants harms the public perception that the criminal justice system is fair 
and accurate). 
 149. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004).  
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Plain error review represents an important procedural pro-
tection for defendants who fail to raise claims at the district 
court level. Consequently, it is essential that appellate courts 
apply the plain error standard and evaluate the merits of de-
fendants’ inadequate factual basis claims.  
D. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS UNDERSCORE THE NEED TO 
PERMIT APPELLATE REVIEW OF INADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS 
CLAIMS 
In addition to the applicable legal arguments, important 
public policy concerns dictate that a defendant preserves his 
right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis that supports 
his convictions when he enters a guilty plea. First, the factual 
basis requirement serves to protect the fundamental principle 
of our criminal justice system that the state will not convict an 
innocent individual. Second, unfortunate realities and inequali-
ties that exist within the plea bargaining system dictate that 
courts must allow appellate review of factual basis claims.  
1. The State Should Not Convict Innocent Individuals 
Courts of appeals that have permitted review of factual ba-
sis claims have primarily supported their decisions with impor-
tant policy justifications underlying the factual basis require-
ment.150 Indeed, the idea that the state will not convict an 
innocent individual for a crime that he did not commit 
represents one of the most fundamental principles of the U.S. 
criminal justice system.151 Allowing innocent individuals to 
plead guilty to crimes that they did not commit undermines the 
public’s confidence in the fairness and integrity of the judicial 
system.152 The Supreme Court has explained that “in our free 
 
 150. See, e.g., United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1524 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(citing the policy rationales presented in McCarthy and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure’s 1966 advisory committee’s note).  
 151. See ABA Comm. on Criminal Justice Standards, ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice Pleas of Guilty, No. 14-1.6 cmt. at 66 (3d ed. 1999) (“Our sys-
tem has concluded, in order to protect the innocent, that persons whose con-
duct does not fall within the charges brought by a prosecutor should not be 
permitted to plead guilty.”); Barkai, supra note 10, at 95 n.43 (“‘The desired 
outcome is that the defendant should be declared guilty if and only if he has 
committed the offense with which he is charged.’” (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 85 (1971))).  
 152. See Stephanos Bibas, Exacerbating Injustice, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 53, 55 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2008/ 
Bibas.pdf (“Blatantly unjust pleas can only sap public faith in and compliance 
with the law.”). 
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society,” it is essential that an ordinary citizen have “confidence 
that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal of-
fense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with 
utmost certainty.”153 The underlying principle of the factual ba-
sis requirement, which is to protect a defendant who does not 
realize “that his conduct does not actually fall within the 
charge,”154 accords with this fundamental notion.  
Although these values seem engrained in our judicial sys-
tem, some scholars have argued that allowing innocent indi-
viduals to plead guilty to crimes that they have not committed 
provides a positive outcome for defendants, and thus benefits 
the criminal justice system.155 These scholars contend that in 
our current system, there is little doubt that truly innocent in-
dividuals plead guilty to crimes that they did not commit,156 
mostly to avoid harsher punishments.157 Specifically, these 
scholars claim that most innocent defendants are recidivists 
charged with petty crimes.158 As a result, it is in the best inter-
est of the defendant to plead guilty to a crime that he did not 
commit in order to avoid the “process cost” of taking the case all 
the way through to trial.159 
Although this view does capture some of the unfortunate 
realities of our current system, its rationale undermines impor-
tant foundations of our criminal law. Allowing an innocent in-
dividual to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit contra-
dicts the important ideal that a guilty plea represents a 
defendant’s knowing admission of the fact that he committed a 
 
 153. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 154. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (quoting FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1966)).  
 155. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 
1120 (2008) (arguing it is in the best interest of certain innocent criminal de-
fendants to plead guilty). 
 156. See Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Prac-
tices in Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 309–10 (1975) (estimating that 
one-third of defendants who plead guilty could ultimately escape conviction).  
 157. See Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences 
in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines 
States,105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 982 (2005) (noting that defendants, in general, 
often plead guilty to avoid charges that carry higher sentences). 
 158. See Bowers, supra note 155, at 1125 (“[The] recidivist majority is over-
represented among the population of wrongfully accused.”). 
 159. Id. at 1119–20 (“For the typical innocent defendant in the typical case 
. . . the best resolution is generally a quick plea in exchange for a light, bar-
gained-for sentence.”).  
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crime.160 If our system is willing to stand idly by while the 
State convicts an individual without putting forth facts that 
prove his guilt, “the presumption of innocence[,] . . . whose ‘en-
forcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law,’”161 will surely fall by the wayside. Above all, it is 
simply morally unacceptable for the State to knowingly punish 
innocent individuals.162 
These important public policy concerns demonstrate the 
essential role of the factual basis requirement. As a result, it is 
crucial that the federal judicial system preserve a defendant’s 
right to challenge the adequacy of the factual basis that sup-
ports his guilty plea.  
2. The Realties of the Plea Bargaining Process Highlight the 
Necessity of Review 
In addition to protecting innocent defendants from plead-
ing guilty to crimes that they did not commit, other realities of 
the plea bargaining process demonstrate the necessity of appel-
late review of factual basis claims. First, inconsistent and 
sometimes careless behavior by trial court judges reveals that 
the factual basis requirement does not always serve its impor-
tant function of providing protection for criminal defendants.163 
Although the Federal Rules establish a factual basis require-
ment, they do not set forth procedures for conducting factual 
basis inquiries.164 As a result, trial judges have vast discretion 
in fulfilling the factual basis requirement.165 
 
 160. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea 
Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 969 (1989) (“[O]ur criminal justice system is 
committed to the dual assumptions that the defendant knows the facts that 
determine his guilt and that he is sincere if he confesses those facts in a 
guilty plea.”). 
 161. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 435 (1895)).  
 162. Bibas, supra note 148, at 1384 (“One should recoil at the thought of 
convicting innocent defendants. . . . There is something profoundly troubling 
about knowingly facilitating injustice . . . .”).  
 163. See Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty Plea Process in Indiana: A Proposal to 
Strengthen the Diminishing Factual Basis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REV. 1127, 
1138–43 (2001) (noting how trial judges do not apply the factual basis re-
quirement with consistency and at times fail to protect the rights of criminal 
defendants in the interests of efficiency).  
 164. See Barkai, supra note 10, at 128 (explaining that the scope of factual 
basis inquiries in the federal system “varies from case to case”).  
 165. See ABA Comm. on Criminal Justice Standards, supra note 151, No. 
14-1.6(a) cmt. at 66 (noting that the court has “significant flexibility” in fulfil-
ling the factual basis requirement); Penrod, supra note 163, at 1142 (hig-
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Inevitably, this discretion leads some judges to disregard 
the importance of the requirement. For example, a survey of 
state trial court judges in Indiana revealed that the state’s lack 
of process requirements for factual basis inquiries led judges to 
“abdicate . . . their responsibility to ensure that a plea of guilty 
is voluntarily made with full appreciation of the consequences 
of the action.”166 Other studies reveal that judges often neglect 
the factual basis requirement and that “questions during pre-
trial tend to focus on the appropriate sentence rather than on 
the factual basis for the plea.”167 Some scholars have argued 
that these realities of the judicial system produce a factual ba-
sis requirement that is “relatively unimportant”168 and “more 
form than substance.”169 The inattention that some judges 
grant to the factual basis requirement highlights the necessity 
of allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the factual 
basis of their guilty pleas on appeal.  
Moreover, other deficiencies inherent in the plea bargain-
ing process demonstrate the importance of permitting defend-
ants to challenge the adequacy of the factual basis of their con-
victions. Many commentators have noted that the government’s 
principal goals in plea bargaining are efficiency and obtaining 
convictions, as opposed to justice and fairness.170 In striking an 
agreement with the defendant, the prosecutor hopes to secure a 
guilty plea as quickly as possible, regardless of the factual real-
ities of a case.171 In addition, racial disparities affect the plea-
bargaining process,172 and minorities may be more likely to re-
 
hlighting a “great deal of discretion” for judges and characterizing it 
as “troubling”).  
 166. Penrod, supra note 163, at 1142.  
 167. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A 
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 256 (2006) (analyzing survey re-
sults from plea bargaining systems in Germany, Florida, and Connecticut). 
 168. Alschuler, supra note 35.  
 169. Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due 
Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 930 n.164 (1980).  
 170. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargain-
ing and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Coun-
sel and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 191–93 (2002) (describing prosecu-
tors’ incentives in plea bargaining).  
 171. See id. at 192. (“Plea bargaining’s prime incentive to the prosecutor is 
an increase in the total efficiency of the criminal justice system.”).  
 172. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of 
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 32 (1998) (“Prosecutors often make deci-
sions that discriminate against African American victims and defendants.”). 
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ceive a harsher charge and sentence than white defendants.173 
Moreover, ineffective assistance of counsel also affects a defend-
ant’s decision to plead guilty. The fact that such claims fre-
quently accompany factual basis appeals demonstrates that a 
defendant will often plead guilty because of his attorney’s fail-
ure to recognize that the facts involved in the case do not con-
stitute a crime.174 The vast variety of concerns regarding the 
practical realities of the criminal justice system reemphasize 
the importance of allowing appellate review of inadequate fac-
tual basis claims.  
Sound legal arguments and important public policy con-
cerns accentuate the need to ensure that defendants preserve 
the right to state a claim on appeal that an inadequate factual 
basis supports their convictions. The remainder of this Note 
discusses action that the Supreme Court should take in order 
to ensure that defendants have the ability to challenge the ade-
quacy of the factual basis of their guilty pleas.  
III.  CLEARING UP THE CONFUSION: PROVIDING CLEAR 
RULES FOR FACTUAL BASIS APPEALS   
Both legal arguments and policy justifications reveal the 
importance of allowing defendants to challenge the adequacy of 
the factual basis of their guilty pleas. However, the current 
state of the law has led to ambiguity and confusion regarding 
whether a defendant has the right to file such an appeal. 
Through its power of judicial rulemaking, the Supreme Court 
should eliminate this confusion and firmly establish that a de-
fendant has the ability to challenge the adequacy of the factual 
basis of his guilty plea on appeal. The Court should propose an 
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expli-
citly stating that a defendant does not waive his right to appeal 
the adequacy of the factual basis that supports his guilty plea, 
and that appellate courts should review such claims under a 
plain error standard. Although the Court could settle the issue 
through its power of judicial review, an amendment to the Fed-
eral Rules represents the clearest and easiest way to resolve 
the current circuit split. 
 
 173. See Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1520–30 (1988) (summarizing studies on the racial im-
pacts of prosecutors’ charging decisions); id. at 1603–41 (summarizing studies 
of racial differences at sentencing). 
 174. See, e.g., United States v. Negron-Narvaez, 403 F.3d 33, 34 (1st Cir. 
2005); United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778, 785 (11th Cir. 1996).  
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A. AN AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE WOULD SECURE A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO APPEAL  
Although its previous case law answers some questions re-
garding when a defendant may challenge the factual basis of 
his plea,175 the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the 
issue of whether a defendant waives his ability to put forth on 
appeal a claim of an inadequate factual basis after entering an 
unconditional guilty plea. It is notable that in its recent discus-
sion of this question, the Eighth Circuit did not cite any Su-
preme Court precedent.176 The Supreme Court’s silence on the 
issue has led to an amalgam of divergent case law from the 
courts of appeals and confusion regarding whether a defendant 
has waived his right to challenge the facts that support his 
guilty plea.  
The most efficient and effective manner to resolve the am-
biguity is for the Court to propose an amendment to the Feder-
al Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules Enabling Act allows 
the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules of practice and 
procedure” for the federal courts.177 This multistep process first 
involves discussion and public debate of the proposed amend-
ment by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Advisory 
Committee.178 After the Advisory Committee approves the pro-
posed amendment, it moves to the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, a group of federal judges under the direction of 
the Chief Justice of the United States,179 for further approv-
al.180 After granting approval, the Judicial Conference trans-
mits the proposed amendment to the Supreme Court, who in 
turn submits the rule to Congress for review.181 If Congress 
does not take any action on the proposed rule, it becomes effec-
tive.182 
 
 175. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 (1998) (holding that a 
defendant may challenge the adequacy of the factual basis of his conviction via 
collateral attack). 
 176. See United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 177. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4648, 
4648 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006)).  
 178. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b)–(d) (specifying the role of the standing com-
mittees to the Judicial Conference).  
 179. See id. § 331 (2006) (describing the composition, purpose, and duties of 
the Judicial Conference of the United States).  
 180. See id. § 2073(a)(1) (“The Judicial Conference shall prescribe and pub-
lish the procedures for the consideration of proposed rules under this section.”). 
 181. See id. § 2074 (2006). 
 182. Id. For a general description and discussion of the rulemaking process, 
see James C. Duff, A Summary for the Bench and Bar, USCOURTS.GOV (Oct. 
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Before initiating this process, the Advisory Committee 
must first determine where and how to amend the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure to properly ensure that a defend-
ant has the right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis of 
her guilty plea. Rule 11(b)(3) of the Federal Rules, which cur-
rently defines the factual basis requirement, represents the 
most logical location to include such an amendment. A simple 
sentence following the current version of the rule would suffice 
to resolve the confusion regarding whether a defendant may 
lodge an appeal based on an inadequate factual basis. The sen-
tence should state: “A defendant’s guilty plea does not waive a 
claim of an inadequate factual basis on appeal.” This basic 
change would ensure the protection of a defendant’s rights 
when he decides to plead guilty.  
B. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD REQUIRE A PLAIN ERROR 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR FACTUAL BASIS APPEALS 
In addition to establishing that a defendant entering a 
guilty plea does not waive a factual basis appeal, any amend-
ment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should specif-
ically address the appropriate standard of review to apply to a 
claim of an inadequate factual basis. As previously noted, the 
appeals courts have applied a wide array of standards to claims 
challenging the factual basis of a guilty plea. Given the unique 
nature of how factual basis appeals arise, however, the plain 
error standard represents the most appropriate standard of re-
view. Since a defendant does not raise a factual basis claim at 
the trial court level, the claim will logically become “for-
feited.”183 As a result, appellate courts should apply the stan-
dard four-pronged plain error analysis to determine whether a 
defendant’s claim of an inadequate factual basis warrants re-
versal.184 
One could argue that the “rigorous standard”185 of plain er-
ror review creates too difficult a requirement for the defendant 




 183. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (explaining that 
a claim is forfeited when a defendant does not make a “timely assertion of right”). 
 184. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 587 F.3d 509, 519–21 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(reviewing a factual basis appeal under a plain error standard).  
 185. United States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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peal.186 However, the factual basis requirement is of such great 
importance that a finding of an inadequate factual basis on ap-
peal will often satisfy the plain error test.187 The notion that 
the state would convict an innocent individual represents a 
fundamental “miscarriage of justice” that would merit appellate 
review and reversal even under a plain error standard.188 
Other standards of review are not appropriate for inade-
quate factual basis claims. A de novo standard is not suitable 
for factual basis appeals because appellate courts do not have 
the capacity to engage in a renewed factual inquiry.189 On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, an abuse of discretion standard 
does not provide the defendant with appropriate protection. 
The rigid nature of this standard leads to almost no rever-
sals,190 and therefore renders a defendant’s appeal practically 
meaningless. One could contend that because “the district 
court’s acceptance of a guilty plea is considered a factual find-
ing,” an inadequate factual basis claim should be reviewed un-
der the clear error standard.191 However, this logic ignores the 
important factor that the defendant failed to recognize the fac-
tual basis error at the trial court level and thus “forfeited” his 
claim. Although it is essential that a defendant maintain his 
right to appeal, it is also important that the criminal justice 
system creates incentives for the defendant “to think and act 
early when Rule 11 is at stake.”192 The plain error standard 
strikes the proper balance of protecting the rights of the de-
fendant and maintaining the integrity of the system.  
 
 186. See Amy E. Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other Concepts: A Short 
Course in Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 43, 61 (2006) (“[A]ppellate 
courts are rarely persuaded to reverse for plain error . . . .”).  
 187. See, e.g., Garcia, 587 F.3d at 521 (holding that a factual basis error 
represents a plain error that requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction); 
Majko v. United States, 457 F.2d 790, 791–92 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (re-
versing a guilty plea on the grounds of an inadequate factual basis based on 
the common-law plain error doctrine). 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 270 F. App’x 454, 455 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(reversing a defendant’s conviction because a factual basis error represents a miscar-
riage of justice). 
 189. See Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the 
Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 444–48 (2004) (detailing the 
principal reasons appellate courts should not engage in fact-finding). 
 190. See Peters, supra note 86, at 244 (noting that abuse of discretion is a 
“difficult standard for an appellant to overcome”).  
 191. United States v. Rivas, 85 F.3d 193, 194 (5th Cir. 1996); see also FED. 
R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”).  
 192. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 73 (2002). 
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C. A SUPREME COURT DECISION RESOLVING THE ISSUE IS AN 
UNLIKELY SOLUTION 
Some may argue that an amendment to the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure represents an improbable and inade-
quate solution to the issue at hand. Specifically, critics may 
point to the complexity of the amendment process and the low 
chance that a proposed amendment will actually become law.193 
As an alternative, these critics may argue that a decision from 
the Supreme Court is the most practical solution to establish 
whether a defendant has the right to appeal the adequacy of 
the factual basis that supports his guilty plea. 
The recent decision from the Supreme Court in Flores-
Figueroa v. United States194 provides an apt example of a case 
that could have provided this opportunity. In Flores-Figueroa, 
the Court ruled that the statutory language of the federal ag-
gravated identity theft statute195 required the Government to 
demonstrate that the defendant “knew that the ‘means of iden-
tification’ he or she unlawfully transferred, possessed, or used, 
in fact, belonged to ‘another person.’”196 As a result of this hold-
ing, a defendant who previously pled guilty to aggravated iden-
tity theft could now challenge the factual basis of his plea on 
direct appeal. Specifically, the defendant could argue that the 
facts underlying his plea do not constitute a crime because he 
did not know that the means of identification actually belonged 
to another person. If the court of appeals hearing this challenge 
decided that the defendant’s guilty plea waived his right to ap-
peal, the Supreme Court would have the opportunity to grant 
certiorari. The Court could then resolve the ambiguity that ex-
ists among the lower courts and conclude that a defendant 
maintains his right to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis 
of his guilty plea.  
However, a decision from the Supreme Court such as the 
one described above is unlikely for many reasons. First, the 
Court’s relatively small docket makes it unlikely that it will 
grant a writ of certiorari solely to review whether a defendant 
 
 193. See Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Criminal Rules Docket (His-
torical), U.S. COURTS (Sep. 19, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/2010-CRDocket.pdf.  
 194. 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).  
 195. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) (2006).  
 196. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1888 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).  
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has waived his right to appeal.197 Second, the current composi-
tion of the Court renders it unclear whether it would hold that 
a defendant may challenge the adequacy of the factual basis of 
his guilty plea on appeal. It is quite possible that the majority 
of the Justices, citing the importance of the finality of plea 
agreements, could adopt the reasoning of appellate courts that 
have held that a defendant’s guilty plea waives his right to 
challenge the adequacy of the factual basis of his conviction.198 
Third, the Court has ruled explicitly that a defendant can chal-
lenge the factual basis of his guilty plea via collateral attack.199 
Therefore, it is likely that defense attorneys will advise their 
clients to forgo a direct appeal and simply file a motion to va-
cate the sentence,200 especially given the uncertainty of how the 
Court may rule on whether the defendant has the ability to 
challenge the plea on direct appeal. As a result, it is unlikely 
that a direct appeal would reach the Supreme Court. Although 
the above example demonstrates that a factual basis appeal to 
the Supreme Court is possible, a perfect storm of facts and low-
er court decisions would need to occur.  
On the other hand, the Court does not need to wait for a 
perfect set of facts and decisions to propose an amendment to 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Recognizing the ur-
gency of the issue, the Court can proceed immediately by pro-
posing additional language to Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11(b)(3) to solidify a defendant’s right to appeal the 
adequacy of the factual basis that supports his conviction.  
  CONCLUSION   
The requirement that a factual basis underlies a guilty 
plea serves an important role in protecting the rights of crimi-
nal defendants. A defendant who enters a guilty plea without 
facts that support it should have the right to appeal his convic-
tion. However, inconsistencies among the courts of appeals and 
a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court have led to ambigu-
ity and confusion among the lower courts regarding whether 
 
 197. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme 
Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 738 (2001) (noting a dra-
matic decline in the number of cases that the Supreme Court hears annually).  
 198. For example, in his dissent in Bousley, Justice Scalia, joined by Jus-
tice Thomas, stressed the importance of the finality of plea agreements in the 
criminal justice system and described the majority’s opinion as a “grave mis-
take.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 636 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 199. See id. at 629.  
 200. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). 
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the defendant possesses this essential right to an appeal. The 
nature of the factual basis claim, the procedural device of plain 
error review, and public policy concerns all support allowing a 
defendant to appeal the adequacy of the factual basis of his 
conviction. The Supreme Court should take the immediate step 
of proposing an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to ensure that a defendant may challenge the ade-
quacy of the factual basis of his plea on appeal. Preserving this 
right will ensure important protections for criminal defendants 
and help maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
